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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The human contribution to major accidents 
Recent major accidents in complex industrial sys-
tems, such as in oil & gas platforms and in the avia-
tion industry, were deeply connected to human fac-
tors, leading to catastrophic consequences. A 
striking example would be the investigation report 
from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011) of 
the April 2010 blowout, in which eleven men died 
and almost five million barrels of oil were spilled in 
the Gulf of Mexico. The investigators unarguably 
emphasized the human factors role: features such a 
failure to interpret a pressure test and delay in react-
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ing to signals were found to have interacted with 
poor communication, lack of training and manage-
ment problems to produce this terrible disaster. Oth-
er contemporary investigation reports, such as the 
Rio-Paris Flight 447 (Bureau d’Enquêtes et 
d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile, 
2011) and Fukushima (Kurokawa, 2012), share the 
same characteristics regarding the significance of 
human-related features to the undesirable outcome. 
Thus, the understanding of the interactions be-
tween human factors, technology aspects and the or-
ganisational context seems to be vital, in order to en-
sure the safety of engineering systems and minimise 
the possibility of major accidents. A suitable Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) technique is usually ap-
plied to approach the human contribution to undesir-
able events. 
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1.2 Human reliability analysis: a brief review 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) can be gener-
ally defined as a predictive tool, intended to estimate 
the probability of human errors and weigh the human 
factors contribution to the overall risk by using qual-
itative and/or quantitative methods.  
In the early 60’s, the first structured method to be 
used by industry to quantify human error was pre-
sented by Swain (1963), which later evolved to the 
well-known Technique for Human Error Rate Pre-
diction - THERP (Swain and Guttman, 1983). This 
technique was initially developed to deal with nucle-
ar plant applications, using in-built human error 
probabilities adjusted by performance-shaping fac-
tors and dependencies (interrelated errors) to deliver 
a human reliability analysis event tree. Some re-
searchers (e.g. Reason, 1990; Kirwan, 1997; Everdij 
and Blom, 2013) refer to THERP as the most well-
known method to assess human reliability and pro-
vide data to probabilistic safety assessments. 
The accident model acknowledged as the “Swiss 
Cheese model”, developed by Reason (1990), can be 
addressed as the most influential piece of work in 
the human factors field. It has been widely used to 
describe the dynamics of accident causation and ex-
plain how complex systems can fail through a com-
bination of simultaneous factors (or as a result of the 
alignment of the holes of the Swiss cheese slices 
(Figure 1). 
  
Figure 1. “Swiss Cheese Model” after Reason (1997) 
 
Many Human Reliability Analysis subsequently de-
veloped were, to some extent, inspired by this mod-
el. Examples are the Human Factors Analysis Meth-
odology – HFAM (Pennycook and Embrey, 1993), 
the Sequentially Outlining and Follow-up Integrated 
Analysis – SOFIA (Blajev, 2002), the Human Fac-
tors Analysis and Classification System – HFACS 
(Shappell et al. 2007), extensively used to investi-
gate military and commercial aviation accidents, and 
the Systematic Occurrence Analysis Methodology - 
SOAM (Licu et al., 2007).  
The concept that accidents arise from an arrange-
ment of latent failures, later renamed to latent condi-
tions (Reason, 1997), and active failures in complex 
systems demonstrated accuracy and practicality to 
guide prevention measures (Hopkins, 1999). Rea-
son’s studies of human errors have focused on the 
work environment, human control processes and safe 
operation of high-technology industrial systems, and 
included management issues and organisational fac-
tors. 
There are several methods to assess human per-
formance in different domains, and the development 
of such tools was notably triggered by the advances 
in high-technology industrial systems, particularly 
nuclear plants, aerospace, offshore oil and gas, mili-
tary and commercial aviation, chemical and petro-
chemical, and navigation. Some of them were as-
sessed by Bell and Holroyd (2009), who reported 72 
different techniques to estimate human reliability 
and considered 35 to be potentially relevant. Further 
analysis highlighted 17 of these HRA tools to be of 
potential use for major hazard directorates in the 
United Kingdom. These techniques are usually sepa-
rated by generations, which basically reflect the fo-
cus of the analysis. 
The first generation methods, developed between 
the 60’s and early 90’s, are mainly focused on the 
task to be performed by operators. Essentially, po-
tential human erroneous actions during the task se-
quence are identified, and the initial probability is 
then adjusted by internal and external factors (per-
formance shaping factors, error-forcing conditions, 
scaling factors or performance influencing factors, 
depending on the methodology) to deliver a final es-
timation of human error probabilities. The key step 
in this approach is selecting the critical tasks to be 
performed by operators, which are considered to be 
elements or components subjected to failure due to 
inborn characteristics, thus having an “inbuilt proba-
bility of failure”. These methods are widely recog-
nised and commonly preferred by practitioners, 
probably because they provide a straightforward 
output such as an event tree or a probability value 
that can be directly integrated to Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments. Some examples are THERP, HEART 
(Human Error Assessment and Reduction Tech-
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nique), presented by Williams (1986), and JHEDI 
(Justification of Human Error Data Information), in-
troduced by Kirwan and James (1989). 
Alternatively, second generation techniques have 
been developed from late 90’s and are based on the 
principle that the central element of human factors 
assessments is actually the context in which the task 
is performed, reducing previous emphasis on the 
task characteristics per se and on a hypothetical in-
herent human error probability. “A Technique for 
Human Error Analysis” – ATHEANA (Cooper et al., 
1996), the Connectionism Assessment of Human 
Reliability (CAHR) based on Sträter (2000) and the 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM) by Hollnagel (1998) are good examples 
of this kind of approach, all reflecting the focus shift 
from tasks to context to provide a better understand-
ing of human error and integrate engineering, social 
sciences and psychology concepts. More recent liter-
ature (e.g. Kirwan et al., 2005; Bell and Holroyd, 
2009) alludes to the Nuclear Action Reliability As-
sessment – NARA (Kirwan et al., 2005) as the be-
ginning of the third generation methods. However, it 
seems to be merely an update of first generation 
techniques, i.e. HEART, using more recent data 
from newer databases such as CORE-DATA (Gib-
son and Megaw, 1999).   
All these methods provide a number of taxono-
mies to handle possible internal and external factors 
that could influence human behaviour. Modern data 
classification taxonomies are mostly derived from 
Swain’s (1982) work, in which he organised human 
errors in errors of omission and errors of commis-
sion, being the former a failure to execute something 
expected to be done (partially or entirely), while the 
latter can be translated as an incorrect action when 
executing a task or a failure to execute an action in 
time. The issue modelling human errors through the 
prediction of human behaviour during complex rare 
events was addressed by Rasmussen (1983), who 
envisioned the Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) model. 
He differentiated three basic levels of human per-
formance: skill-based, when automated actions fol-
low an intention (sensory-motor behaviour); rule-
based, when there is a procedure or technique guid-
ing the action; and knowledge-based, represented by 
actions developed to deal with an unfamiliar situa-
tion. Reason (1990) split human errors in slips and 
lapses, when an execution failure or an omission oc-
curs, and mistakes, which result from judgement 
processes used to select an objective, or the means to 
accomplish it. Later, Rasmussen’s theory was en-
compassed by Reason to further categorise mistakes 
in rule-based mistakes, when a problem-solving se-
quence is known, but an error choosing the right so-
lution to deal with the signals occurs; and 
knowledge-based mistakes, when the problem is not 
under a recognisable structure thus a stored trouble-
shooting solution cannot be immediately applied. 
Reason also highlighted an alternative behaviour 
from a social context, called “violation”. This con-
cept was split in exceptional and routine violations, 
both emerging from an intentional deviation from 
operating procedures, codes of practice or standards. 
Although the classification schemes are usually 
connected to the industrial domain for which they 
were originally developed, some of them are non-
specific (e.g. HEART) and thus have been success-
fully applied in a broader range of industries. 
Regardless of the variety of HRA methods availa-
ble to enable practitioners to assess the risks associ-
ated with human error by estimating its probability, 
the substantially high uncertainties related to the 
human behavioural characteristics, interlaced with 
actual technology aspects and organisational context, 
turn this kind of evaluation into a very complicated 
matter, thus has been raising reasonable concern 
about the accuracy and practicality of such probabili-
ties. 
1.3 Human performance data limitations 
Data collection and the availability of a meaningful 
dataset to feed human reliability and other approach-
es related to the assessment of human performance 
in engineering systems seems to be the most severe 
constraints. Many studies in the early 90’s addressed 
these issues, and both the unavailability of data on 
human performance in complex systems (Swain, 
1990) and limitations related to the data collection 
process (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1990) 
were considered to be problems extremely difficult 
to overcome. Therefore, some efforts to collect acci-
dent data such as the Storybuilder Project (Bellamy 
et al, 2006) were undertaken, aiming at the classifi-
cation and statistical analysis of occupational acci-
dents. 
In a contemporary review, Grabowski et al. 
(2009) suggests that the exponential rise of electron-
ic records even worsened the problems related with 
human error data, stating that data validation, com-
patibility, integration and harmonization are in-
creasingly significant challenges in maritime data 
  
analysis and risk assessments. This indicates that 
difficulties to find usable human error and human 
factors data are still a major concern, which deserves 
to be carefully addressed by practitioners and re-
searchers. 
Moura et al (2015) discriminated some of the dif-
ficulties that might be preventing the development of 
a comprehensive dataset to serve as a suitable input 
to human performance studies in engineering sys-
tems. Main issues can be summarised by: (i) dissimi-
lar jargons and nomenclatures used by distinct indus-
trial sectors are absorbed by the classification 
method, making some taxonomies specific to partic-
ular industries; (ii) the effort to collect human data is 
time-consuming, and the need for inserting the “hu-
man contribution figures” into safety studies favours 
the immediate use of expert elicitation, instead of a 
dataset; (iii) The accuracy of the collection method is 
very difficult to assess, and distinct sources (e.g. 
field data, expert elicitation, performance indicators 
or accident investigation reports) can lead to differ-
ent results; and (iv) the interfaces between human 
factors, technological aspects and the organisation 
are context-dependent and can be combined in nu-
merous ways. This turns early predictions into a very 
difficult matter, due to the variability of the envi-
ronment and the randomness of human behaviour.  
 Therefore, in this work, these significant draw-
backs will be minimised by the development of a 
novel industrial accidents dataset, bringing together 
major accident reports from different industrial 
backgrounds and classifying them under a common 
framework. In spite of being a time-consuming and a 
laborious process, the accidents collection and the 
detailed interpretation will provide a rich data 
source, enabling the usage of integrated information 
to generate input to design improvement schemes.     
 Accident investigations can be considered to be 
one of the most valuable and reliable sources of in-
formation for future use, provided that several man-
hours from a commissioned expert team are applied 
in an in-depth analysis of an undesirable event se-
quence, providing detailed insight into the genesis of 
industrial accidents. 
 
2 CLASSIFICATION METHOD 
2.1 The Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis 
Method (CREAM) taxonomy as a common 
framework to classify accidents 
In a previous work, some of the most used taxono-
mies in human reliability analysis were examined as 
possible inputs to the establishment of a data classi-
fication framework for a global accidents dataset. 
The three nomenclature sets considered by Moura 
(2015) were The Human Factors Analysis and Clas-
sification System - HFACS (Shappell et al. 2007), 
the Error Promoting Conditions (EPCs) from the 
Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique 
(HEART) and the CREAM categorisation.  
The fact that CREAM uses a nonspecific taxono-
my, thus adaptable to most industrial segments, and 
its natural separation between man, technology and 
organisation, facilitating the accidents classification, 
made this terminology to be selected, in order to 
originate the structure of the new dataset.  
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the dataset classification 
structure. 
Figure 2. “Man” categorisation, adapted from Hollnagel (1998). 
  
  
Figure 3. ““Technology” categorisation, adapted from 
Hollnagel (1998). 
 
Figure 4. “Organisation” categorisation, adapted from 
Hollnagel (1998). 
 
The 53 factors which could have influenced each of 
the 238 assessed accidents are organised in the three 
major groups depicted in Figures 2, 3 and 4. The 
“man” group concentrates human-related phenotypes 
in the action sub-group, representing the possible 
manifestation of human errors through erroneous ac-
tions (Wrong Time, Wrong Type, Wrong Object and 
Wrong Place), usually made by operators in the 
front-line. These flawed movements cover omitted 
or wrong actions; early, late, short, long or wrong 
movements, including in an incorrect direction or 
with inadequate force, speed or magnitude; skipping 
one or more actions or inverting the actions order 
during a sequence.  
Possible causes or triggering factors with human 
roots can be classified as Specific Cognitive Func-
tions, or the general sequence of mental mechanisms 
(Observe-Interpret-Plan) which leads the human be-
ing to respond to a stimulus. Also, temporary (e.g. 
fatigue, distraction or stress) and permanent disturb-
ances (biases such as a hypothesis fixation or the 
tendency to search for a confirmation of previous as-
sumptions) can be captured under the sub-groups 
Temporary and Permanent Person-related Functions. 
These are the person-related genotypes. 
   The second major group (Figure 3) represent 
technological genotypes, associated with procedures, 
equipment and system failures, as well as shortcom-
ings involving the outputs (signals and information) 
provided by interfaces. The last group (Figure 4) en-
compasses organisational contributing factors, repre-
senting the work environment and the social context 
of the industrial activity. It involves latent conditions 
(such as a design failure), communication shortcom-
ings and operation, maintenance, training, quality 
control and management problems. Factors such as 
adverse ambient conditions and unfavourable work-
ing conditions (e.g. irregular working hours) are also 
included in this category. 
3 REVIEW OF 238 MAJOR ACCIDENTS: 
THE MULTI-ATTRIBUTE TECHNOLOGICAL 
ACCIDENTS DATASET (MATA-D) 
3.1 MATA-D conception: data selection 
To overcome the problems of the data collection 
process and the quality variability of different data 
sources, this work limits the data gathering to de-
tailed accounts of accidents occurred in the industrial 
segments listed in Table 1. Accident reports and de-
tailed case studies contain comprehensive infor-
mation about the events, which can be interpreted 
and modelled into the groups and sub-groups shown 
in Figures 2, 3 and 4, to serve as input to the newly-
created Multi-attribute Technological Accidents Da-
taset (MATA-D). The original reports were obtained 
from reliable sources such as regulators, investiga-
tion panels, government bodies, insurance compa-
nies and industry experts. A detailed account of the 
contributing institutions can be found in Moura et al 
(2015). The dataset covers major accidents occurred 
  
worldwide, from the early fifties to today. Table 1 
shows the accidents time-spam per industrial activi-
ty. 
It is worth mentioning that the data selection crite-
rion brought two significant gains. The use of real-
life accounts reduces uncertainties related to the ac-
curateness of the data, and investigation reports sup-
ply detailed technical info, evidences and an in-depth 
analysis of the interfaces between human factors, 
technology and the organisation in which the event 
occurred. This seems to be one of the finest sources 
of information available, from which MATA-D is 
fully designed. 
 
Table 1.  MATA-D events distribution by industry 
______________________________________________ 
Industry         Accidents  Period 
           ________   __________ 
           #  %       
______________________________________________ 
Refinery         39  16.39 1978 - 2011  
Upstream (Oil & Gas)    37  15.55 1975 - 2012 
Chemicals Factory     29  12.18 1975 - 2011 
Petrochemicals      25  10.50 1974 - 2008 
Nuclear Industry      23  9.66  1953 - 2011 
Civil Construction     16  6.72  1968 - 2011 
Terminals and Distribution  15  6.30  1975 - 2012 
Aviation Industry     13  5.46  1996 - 2013 
Gas Processing      09  3.78  1977 - 2008 
Metallurgical Industry    07  2.94  1975 - 2011 
Waste Treatment Plant   05  2.10  2002 - 2009 
Food Industry       04  1.68  1998 - 2009 
Other         16  6.72  1980 - 2011 
_______________________________________________ 
 
3.2 MATA-D usage  
This new accident dataset aims to provide research-
ers and practitioners with a simple and innovative in-
terface for classifying accidents from any industrial 
sector, reflecting apparently dissimilar events in a 
comparable fashion. The binary classification for the 
evaluated factors (presence or absence) allows data 
interpretation using uncomplicated statistical meth-
ods or sophisticated mathematical models, depend-
ing on the user’s requirements.   
Moreover, the detailed descriptions available for 
each identified factor, as can be seen in the example 
given in Table 2, allows comprehensive understand-
ing and analysis of single accidents, as well as the 
disclosure of the precise evidence of failures associ-
ated with psychological (cognitive functions), engi-
neering (e.g. design and equipment failures) and or-
ganisational (e.g. management problems and 
training) aspects. These descriptions provide an ef-
fective translation of highly technical content reports 
to a linguistic approach easily understood by practi-
tioners from outside the engineering field, facilitat-
ing cross-disciplinary communication among profes-
sionals and academics. Many applications can be de-
veloped from these unique characteristics.   
3.3 Features of the data sample 
1,539 fatalities were recorded in 67 of the 238 ana-
lysed events. Some of the reports also contained 
damage recovery information, and 95 events were 
accountable for more than £20 billion in material 
losses. Apart from these significant features, it is 
acknowledged that many additional costs arise from 
major accidents. It is reported (Fowler, 2013) that 
British Petroleum (BP) paid around US$ 14 billion 
in indenisations related to the Gulf of Mexico oil 
spill clean-up, and Bell (2012) described a 35.00% 
stock price drop from the event occurrence in 2010 
to 2012. 
 However, the most significant feature of the da-
taset events is that all of them involved a major 
emission, fire, explosion or crash, exposing humans 
and/or the environment to serious danger. Thus, 
these events largely fit the definition of “major acci-
dent”, according to the United Kingdom’s Control of 
Major Accident Hazards Regulations (1999). 
3.4 MATA-D Construction: data interpretation and 
classification demonstration method 
The analysis and classification of nearly 250 acci-
dent reports (some events were investigated by more 
than one entity and had multiple records) was a time-
consuming process, but enabled the comparison 
among accidents from different industries. Investiga-
tion reports varied from a few to a maximum of 494 
pages.  
The process involved the interpretation of the ac-
cidents reports and their subsequent classification 
under the common taxonomy to create the dataset.  
Table 2 exemplifies how one of the collected ac-
cidents was carefully decomposed and recorded in 
the MATA-D database. This example scrutinises a 
severe explosion of flammable gasoline constituents 
released from a refinery's hydrofluoric acid (HF) al-
kylation unit, examined by the US Chemical Safety 
and Hazard Investigation Board (2005). The release, 
ignition, fire and several explosions occurred during 
the preparation of a pump repair, which was being 
removed by maintenance workers. As a conse-
quence, six employees were injured, the production 
was stopped for approximately 6 months and a dam-
age repair cost of US$ 13 million was reported. 
  
 
Table 2.  Oil Refinery Fire and Explosion classification example  
 
Group Sub-Group  Factor  Description* 
Man Execution Wrong Type Movement in the wrong direction: during a seal repair, the 
operator attempted to isolate the pump by closing a plug 
valve. He moved the valve wrench to a perpendicular posi-
tion in relation to the flow, believing this was the closed po-
sition, but the valve was actually open. 
Man Specific Cognitive Func-
tions (Observation) 
Observation missed Overlook cue/signal: The valve stem was equipped with a 
position indicator, but the operators overlooked it. The indi-
cator was correctly indicating the open status.  
Man Specific Cognitive Func-
tions (Observation) 
Wrong Identification Incorrect identification: the mechanic specialist recognised 
the valve as closed due to the wrench position and, follow-
ing a safety procedure, placed locks and tags on the valve, 
to prevent its inadvertent opening. 
Man Specific Cognitive Func-
tions (Interpretation) 
Wrong reasoning (i) Deduction error: Operator and mechanic specialist firmly 
believed that the closed valve position was always identified 
by the wrench being perpendicular to the flow of product. 
(ii) Induction Error: after unbolting the flare line, a small re-
lease of a high flammable component was observed for a 
few seconds. As the flux stopped, the operator inferred that 
the pump was de-pressurised and the removal was safe. 
However, vent line was clogged by scale.      
Man Specific Cognitive Func-
tions (Planning) 
Priority error After the installation of the locks, the operator noticed that 
the position indicator was showing that the valve was open, 
but he maintained his plans and left the plant to fetch the 
necessary tools for the pump removal. 
Man Permanent Person Related 
Functions 
Cognitive bias Confirmation bias: search for information was restricted to 
looking at wrench position, which confirmed the operator’s 
assumption that the valve was closed, dismissing a further 
consideration of the fully functioning position indicator. 
Technology Temporary Interface Ambiguous Infor-
mation 
Position mismatch: wrench collar was installed in an unusu-
al position. Usually, the perpendicular wrench position indi-
cates the closed state, while the parallel wrench position in-
dicates the open status. Thus, wrench position (open-close) 
was inverted and thus conflicting with the position indica-
tor.  
Organisation Organisation Maintenance Failure (i) There was no effective preventive/predictive mainte-
nance programme to maintain pumps operational, as inter-
ventions (repair / parts replacement) took place only when 
equipment failed. The investigation of possible failure 
mechanisms (the actual causes of the breakdowns) never 
occurred. 
(ii) Flare line was clogged by scale. 
Organisation Organisation Inadequate Quality 
Control 
(i) Despite the recurring failures of several pump seals in the 
plant (prior to the accident, 23 work orders for similar de-
fects were issued), quality control procedures failed to en-
sure the adequacy of the equipment to the transported prod-
uct and to certify that maintenance procedures were 
suitable.  
(ii) Quality control failed to identify the inadequate installa-
tion of the wrench collar, which allowed the wrench bar to 
stay in an unusual position, unfamiliar to operators. 
Organisation Organisation Design Failure The valve actuator (wrench) collar had a squared shape and 
could be installed in any position, thus there was a discrep-
ancy between the design of the valve and its actuator. De-
sign should have prevented the wrench installation in an un-
usual position. Also, further investigation identified that the 
original actuator was a gear-operated one, and the design 
change to a wrench actuator failed to address further safety 
implications, such as the produced mismatch between the 
position indicator and the wrench position. 
* Adapted from the evidence/accounts from the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2005) Case Study. 
 
 
  
The classification method was applied to the above 
accident and the Table 2 clearly exemplifies how the 
investigation report from an event occurred in a spe-
cific industry (i.e. a refinery) can be decomposed in-
to general categories, enabling the association with 
most industrial sectors. This classification method 
allowed the creation of a dataset composed by major 
accidents from industries with no apparent connec-
tion, but sharing common features (groups, sub-
groups and factors) which contributed to serious 
events. In addition, the dataset preserves the main 
characteristics of the scrutinised events at the de-
scription column, facilitating the prompt understand-
ing of complex investigation reports and allowing 
further analysis of single or grouped events, if re-
quired.   
A seemingly pure human error (which could be 
described by the removal of the pump without clos-
ing the isolation valve or, more specifically, opening 
the isolation valve instead of closing it) can be ex-
plained by some cognitive mechanisms triggered by 
technology and organisational issues. The worker 
tried to isolate a pump for maintenance by putting 
the valve wrench in a perpendicular position in rela-
tion to the piping, which is a widely accepted con-
vention for the closed state of a valve. He disregard-
ed the position indicator at the valve body, assuming 
the wrench position as a sufficient proof of the pump 
isolation. A mechanic specialist who was responsi-
ble for double-checking the isolation, for safety rea-
sons, also deduced that the valve was closed just by 
looking at the wrench position, and locked the valve. 
This allows the identification of valuable cognitive 
functions influencing the human erroneous actions, 
assisted by the terminology of the classification 
method, such as the observation missed, the wrong 
identification, wrong reasoning and priority error. A 
person-related cognitive bias was also categorised, 
explaining why the operator ignored the position in-
dicator.  
Even more important, the link between technolo-
gy, design and human factors can be clearly estab-
lished: the ambiguity of the information provided by 
the interface (unfamiliar wrench position versus po-
sition indicator), triggered by the design failure, mo-
tivated the operator to reason in a way that the error 
of opening the isolation valve, instead of closing it, 
was plausible. Other organisational contributors, 
such as the quality control faults of the wrench in-
stallation and the mechanical integrity programme, 
were also captured by the classification scheme.  
3.5 MATA-D Results & Analysis 
Following the same method presented in Table 2, 
238 major accidents were scrutinised and computed 
into the MATA-D. Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 summarise 
the results obtained from the interpretations of the 
accident reports analysed by the authors, as well as 
the resulting categorisation. 
 
Table 3.  Data Classification results (main groups). 
_________________________________________________ 
Group               Frequency*  
                 _________ 
                 #  %    
_________________________________________________ 
Man                136 57.14 
Technology             196 82.35 
Organisation             227 95.38 
_________________________________________________ 
*Number of events where groups appeared. 
 
Table 4.  Data Classification results (factors & sub-
groups). 
_________________________________________________ 
Factor        Frequency* Sub-Group  Freq.* 
          _________                ____  
          #  %        % 
_________________________________________________ 
Wrong Time      35  14.70 Execution  54.60 
Wrong Type      28  11.80   
Wrong Object    06  2.50    
Wrong Place      75  31.50  
_________________________________________________ 
Observation Missed   37  15.50 Cognitive 
False Observation    08  3.40  Functions** 47.50 
Wrong Identification   06  2.50 
Faulty diagnosis     31  13.00    
Wrong reasoning    27  11.30 
Decision error     22  9.20    
Delayed interpretation   11  4.60    
Incorrect prediction   09  3.80 
Inadequate plan     23  9.70    
Priority error      17  7.10    
_________________________________________________ 
Memory failure     02  0.90  Temp Person   
Fear         05  2.10  Related   
Distraction       14  5.90  Functions  13.00 
Fatigue        07  2.90   
Performance Variability  03  1.40 
Inattention       05  2.10 
Physiological stress    02  0.80    
Psychological stress   07  2.90 
_________________________________________________ 
Functional impairment   01  0.40  Perm. Person 
Cognitive style     00  0.00  Related 
Cognitive bias     17  7.10  Functions  7.60  
_________________________________________________ 
Equipment failure    131 55.00 Equipment  56.30 
Software fault     06  2.50 
_________________________________________________ 
Inadequate procedure   105 44.10 Procedures  44.10 
_________________________________________________ 
Access limitations    03  1.30  Temporary 
Ambiguous information  06  2.50  Interface  18.90 
Incomplete information  42  17.60  
_________________________________________________ 
Access problems     04  1.70  Permanent 
Mislabelling      04  1.70  Interface  3.40 
________________________________________________ 
Communication failure  25  10 .50 Communi-   
Missing information   49  20.60 cation   29.00 
  
_________________________________________________ 
Maintenance failure   83  34.90 Organisation 94.10 
Inadequate quality control 144 60.50 
Management problem   22  9.20 
Design failure     157 66.00 
Inadequate task allocation 143 60.10 
Social pressure     17  7.10 
_________________________________________________ 
Insufficient skills    86  36.10 Training  54.20 
Insufficient knowledge  84  35.30 
_________________________________________________ 
Temperature      03  1.30  Ambient 
Sound        00  0.00  Conditions  8.80 
Humidity       00  0.00 
Illumination      02  0.80    
Other        00  0.00  
Adverse ambient condition 17  7.10 
_________________________________________________ 
Excessive demand    13  5.50  Working   
Poor work place layout  06  2.50  Conditions  11.30 
Inadequate team support  08  3.40 
Irregular working hours  09  3.80 
_________________________________________________ 
*Number of events where factors or sub-groups appeared. 
** Cognitive functions detailed on Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Data Classification results (cognitive func-
tions). 
_________________________________________________ 
Cognitive Function           Frequency*  
                 _________ 
                 #  %    
_________________________________________________ 
Observation             47  19.70 
Interpretation             79  33.20 
Planning              38  16.00 
_________________________________________________ 
*Number of events where cognitive functions appeared. 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 specify the number of appear-
ances of the man-related, technology and organisa-
tional phenotypes and genotypes identified in the 
major accidents examined. Percentages relate to the 
total of events (238). 
At least one human element was identified in 
57.14% of the cases, with 54.60% of direct errone-
ous actions (phenotypes). Cognitive functions ac-
counted for 47.50%, with the interpretation genotype 
appearing as the most relevant (33.20%). At least 
one technology genotype was recognised in 82.35% 
of the accidents, highlighting equipment failure 
(55.00%) and inadequate procedures (44.10%) as the 
foremost factors related to this group. Organisational 
issues appeared in 95.38% of the accidents, empha-
sising design failures (66.00%), inadequate quality 
control (60.50%) and inadequate task allocation 
(60.10%) as the most significant genotypes within 
the group. 
Table 6 presents a macro-analysis of the major 
groups (man, machine and organisation), indicating 
that a single group causing a major accident is not 
common. Merely 0.84% of the examined events 
showed an erroneous action with a man-related gen-
otype resulting in an accident. Exclusively techno-
logical factors were responsible for the undesirable 
outcome in only 3.78% of the cases, while 7.56% of 
the events were solely explained by organisational 
factors. On the other hand, combinations involving a 
minimum of two groups featured significantly in the 
dataset. A Man-Technology arrangement appeared in 
47.48% of the cases, while a Man-Organisation 
combination performed in 56.30%. The Technology-
Organisation pair figured together in 78.57% of the 
events. In 47.48% of the cases, the three groups ap-
peared together. Table 6 summarises these results. 
 
Table 6. Macro-analysis (main groups). 
_________________________________________________ 
Group / Combination          Frequency*  
                 _________ 
                 #  %    
_________________________________________________ 
Only Man              02  0.84  
Only Technology           09  3.78  
Only Organisation           18  7.56 
Man-Technology           113 47.48 
Man-Organisation           134 56.30 
Technology-Organisation        187 78.57 
Man-Technology-Organisation       113 47.48 
_________________________________________________ 
*Events where a single group or combinations appeared. 
 
There is a close relationship between the design fail-
ure genotype and the man group: 72.80% of the er-
roneous actions (execution errors) were accompa-
nied by a design failure, such as in the case study 
presented on Table 2.  In addition, 62.50% of tempo-
rary and permanent person related functions and 
74.34% of cognitive functions were connected to de-
sign failures. 
Also, it is important to notice that the design fail-
ure is the most significant single genotype from all 
three groups, appearing with an incidence of 
66.00%, followed by inadequate quality control 
(60.50%), inadequate task allocation (60.10%) and 
equipment failure (55.00%). Despite the significance 
of these further contributing factors, which can be 
used in future studies to improve the organisation of 
work and disclose operational strategies, the follow-
ing discussion will focus on the design failure geno-
type features and connections revealed by the statis-
tical analysis. 
4 DISCUSSION  
4.1 Improving robustness of system design  
Design failures were detected in 157 of the 238 ma-
jor accidents included in the MATA-D, clearly em-
phasising the need for further developments in de-
sign verification schemes. These deficiencies are 
examples of embedded failures in the system design, 
which can stay dormant for many years before align-
ing with human errors, technology issues and other 
organisational problems to result in a serious occur-
  
rence. The failures related with the design of the Fu-
kushima nuclear power plant, such as insufficient 
tsunami defences combined with the lack of flood 
protection for batteries, which caused the loss of DC 
power, remained dormant for decades. Similarly, ic-
ing problems of the original speed sensors in the 
Airbus 330 airplane persisted for approximately 8 
years before triggering the catastrophic Rio-Paris 
flight crash in 2009. Although these design flaw ex-
amples could be promptly addressed (before the 
alignment of the holes in the Figure 1), the lack of a 
robust dataset containing useful information about 
the multifaceted interaction between human factors, 
technology and organisation in complex systems 
may be preventing standards and regulations from 
addressing the human performance problem in earli-
er stages of the lifecycle of engineering systems, 
such as design, in a structured way. The MATA-D 
construction intends to break this tendency, being 
composed by major accidents from high-technology 
industries to create means of analysing this kind of 
catastrophic events. Also, major accidents are nota-
bly rare events, and the wide-ranging taxonomy used 
to classify events in the MATA-D allows the accu-
mulation of data from several industrial sectors to 
perform a deeper analysis and disclose early contrib-
utors and significant tendencies leading to human er-
rors. 
Other studies were able to identify this relation-
ship between human errors, technology and organi-
sational issues. Bellamy et al (2013) analysed 118 
incidents involving loss of containment in Dutch Se-
veso plants and identified that 59% of the failures to 
use/operate a safety barrier were associated with 
human errors. Despite the application of a different 
classification system for human errors and the inclu-
sion of events with minor consequences (only 9 out 
of 118 events were major accidents reportable under 
Seveso II Directive), these figures might well be re-
lated with the present study findings, in which 
57.14% of the 238 major industrial accidents were 
found to have human contributing causes, as reflect-
ed in the “man” category statistics. 
The comparison of single group accidents with the 
statistics for at least two simultaneous groups on Ta-
ble 6  confirms that high-technology systems require 
a complex interaction of multiple failures in order to 
produce a major accident. It is important to notice 
that not only a number of barriers need to be 
breached, but it also has to interact in a very particu-
lar way. This makes the prediction of all design in-
teractions and responses to human, technology and 
organisational events virtually impossible, highlight-
ing the importance of developing design verification 
schemes to raise the awareness level of designers re-
lating to major accidents. Therefore, providing some 
straightforward information based on the most 
common interactions occurring in complex accidents 
may be of assistance. The relationship between de-
sign failures and human factors indicates that the de-
sign damage tolerance criteria must be tested against 
specific human-related factors disclosed by this re-
search. The direct association of execution errors 
and cognitive functions with design problems is a 
valuable finding, demonstrating how design failures 
can deeply influence human behaviour. 
Design failures particularly appear to trigger fail-
ures in the human capacity to interpret system status 
(wrong reasoning and faulty diagnosis), enable po-
tential observation misses and cause some execution 
errors (sequence, timing and type).  
Based on these findings, an effective design re-
view process should carefully address circumstances 
where some system analysis/diagnosis, interpretation 
or hypothesis formulations are required before taking 
an action. The common man, technology and organi-
sation interfaces discussed indicate that it is likely 
that cues, measurements or information originally in-
tended to lead to a human action have a substantial 
probability of being missed, an effect explained by 
some specific cognitive functions (inferences, gener-
alisations or deductions) highlighted by this study.  
The aim of the review would be to improve sys-
tem design by making it responsive to common ac-
tive failures translated as human erroneous actions, 
such as omissions; jumping forward a required ac-
tion; performing a premature, delayed or wrong ac-
tion; and performing a movement in the wrong di-
rection, with inadequate speed or magnitude. Of 
course these operators’ “action failures” occur in a 
greater frequency than accidents, and should be con-
sidered customary, or part of a non-mechanic behav-
iour. Consequently, human performance will vary, 
and it seems that addressing design shortcomings 
which can affect human behaviour, by learning from 
major accidents in an informed and structured way, 
is a reasonable path to reduce major accidents and 
tackle the genesis of human errors. 
4.2 Using the MATA-D for a design review process: 
an example 
One suitable example of effective design improve-
ment approach would be to apply a design review 
process which considers the connections between 
  
human erroneous actions, cognitive functions and 
design failures highlighted during this study. 
The role of the proposed review process is to 
identify and correct design imperfections that could 
lead to major accidents. Primarily, due to the com-
plexities of high-technology systems, it is important 
to bear in mind that one reviewer is unlikely to hold 
all necessary knowledge to assess all design disci-
plines and aspects (system functionalities, materials, 
mechanics, structure, fabrication methods, electrics, 
chemistry, corrosion protection, risk, compliance 
etc). The person in charge should be able to form a 
team, identifying and engaging with experts in the 
respective fields (face-to-face meetings), whether or 
not they are directly involved in the business. De-
signers, manufacturers, constructors and operators, 
for instance, are obvious interested parties, but refer-
ring to external parties, such as associations, aca-
demic institutions and regulatory bodies, will also 
aggregate significant value to the group task, being 
“time” the key constraint to be managed during this 
phase.     
In summary, the first step would be to (i) identify 
and rank the safety critical elements (SCE) within 
the installation. One helpful definition of SCEs is 
found in the UK Safety Case Regulations (2005), in 
which the term is defined as any part of an installa-
tion whose failure could cause or contribute to a ma-
jor accident, or elements designed to prevent or limit 
the effect of a major accident. Considering the wide 
range of high-technology installations encompassed 
by the MATA-D (e.g. oil and gas, nuclear plants and 
aviation), the SCEs list will vary enormously from 
facility to facility, depending on the industrial seg-
ment assessed. Then, (ii) the information associated 
with the critical elements (e.g. material and func-
tionalities description, conceptual and detailed de-
sign, fabrication and installation drawings and pro-
cess and instrumentation diagrams) are used to 
disclose the relevant human tasks, and (iii) the iden-
tified operations would be tested against the basic 
execution errors disclosed by this study (i.e. omis-
sions; jumping forward a required action; perform-
ing a premature, delayed or wrong action; and per-
forming a movement in the wrong direction, with 
inadequate speed or magnitude), to identify undesir-
able effects affecting the critical elements document-
ed in step (i). Next stage would involve (iv) the as-
sessment of indications intended to trigger human 
actions, such as cues, measurements and displays. 
The possibility of missing them, as discussed in pre-
vious sections, should prompt deep consideration 
about the alternative measures in place (e.g. redun-
dancy, double-check, automatic shut-down, supervi-
sor intervention) to provoke human responsiveness. 
The last review step would comprise the (v) analysis 
of complex tasks, which can be defined as the ones 
requiring observation of signals, its correct interpre-
tation and system diagnosis.  
The mental modelling is inherent to the worker’s 
level of knowledge, the information available and 
the work environment/situation, among other fac-
tors, thus the matter of a human inadequate reason-
ing while evaluating relevant conditions linked to 
critical elements must be considered in the review. 
Although this may seem, at first glance, an exces-
sively challenging task to be undertaken by the de-
sign reviewer, the MATA-D results, which indicate 
specific mechanisms leading to poor interpretations, 
can be used to build a systematic assessment pro-
cess. The available inputs to diagnose the undesira-
ble condition should be listed and evaluated, in order 
to identify where: a) information (e.g. instructions, 
codes & standards, manuals, signals, communica-
tion); b) knowledge (e.g. level of training, education 
and engineering practice) and c) the work situation 
(e.g. adverse ambient conditions, irregular working 
hours, and inadequate work place layout) are likely 
to induce inferences, generalisations or deductions 
which can lead to invalid results. 
Also, most of the industrial fields allow the de-
signers to choose among a wide range of standards 
and protocols as an input to design. Thus, compli-
ance verification is similarly a significant method to 
detect information imperfections, i.e. if the engineer-
ing best practices for the existing condition are being 
applied. The usage of codes and standards which 
consider human factors as well as the disclosed in-
teractions should be preferred.  
Consequently, this design review process should 
be able to identify possible blind spots and reflect a 
“design clarity” degree, indicating if the expected 
functions defined in the conceptual phase are thor-
oughly satisfied during the earlier stages of the in-
stallation lifecycle. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 A new method to apply past accidents lessons to 
design reviews 
Learning from past accidents is essential to minimise 
the possibility of undesirable events recurring, but 
this is not a trivial task. The particular sequence of 
events resulting in a serious accident is multidimen-
sional and highly associated with the perfect align-
  
ment of very specific circumstances within a work 
environment. Consequently, limited learning is like-
ly to arise from the analysis of a single event or even 
a few accidents, justifying the need for a broad com-
prehensive understanding of the common features 
and mechanisms leading to human error, which is 
the aim of the large major accidents collection.  
A new accident dataset, created from detailed in-
vestigation reports and using a classification that 
admits events from different industries, was then in-
troduced.   
This work also described some advantageous 
findings for designers and practitioners who deal 
with major hazard control, in the sense that it is es-
sential to take human error into account during de-
sign. Accordingly, improved insight into erroneous 
actions and influencing factors was revealed, as the 
vast collection of real-life accidents (i.e. 238) pre-
sented relevant relationships between man, technol-
ogy and organisation and disclosed common patterns 
within disasters from different industrial segments.  
Specific human factors to be addressed in a design 
review were then presented in the discussion section 
guidelines, reducing the burden and the time re-
quired to apply extensive human error lists to pre-
dicted tasks or complicated methodologies during 
the development of new projects. This approach, due 
to its simplicity, can be easily adapted to current de-
sign review processes, effectively raising awareness 
for the development of strategies to minimise human 
error through design. 
The MATA-D includes valuable lessons from 
several high-technology industries, such as up-
stream, refining, aviation and nuclear, involving spe-
cialists from different fields and providing common 
input to major hazard control strategies. This new 
dataset can be used for any application requiring 
technical input from past major accidents. 
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